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Abstract 
The aim of this article is to derive fundamental communication conditions 
from central assumptions in recent philosophy of mind and language, and 
then use these conditions to clarify essential similarities and differences 
between face-to-face and interactive communication. The analyses are to a 
large extent made on the basis of participant observations and dialogues 
with students in a further education course for medical paramedics, but the 
conclusions should be of interest to anyone who has a pedagogical interest in 
understanding the nature of the two forms of communication. The arguments 
set out in the article have both a descriptive and a normative dimension. 
They are descriptive in the sense that they aim to give a philosophical 
analysis of successful communication; they are normative in the sense that 
they seek to understand how communication can be improved. The article 
concludes that the philosophical analysis presented constitutes a plausible 
conceptual framework for analyzing empirical phenomena related to face-to-
face and interactive communication. 
1. Introduction 
Lecturers, supervisors and other persons with teaching responsibilities in 
modern education programs are often involved in two forms of 
communication: face-to-face communication, in which the participants in a 
communicative process can observe each other and the wider context of 
communication, and interactive communication, in which communication 
happens through some interactive communication channel. Dialogues with 
students in traditional, physical classrooms are typical examples of the first 
kind of communication; supervision and discussions via internet-based 
programs like ‘Classfronter’ are typical examples of the second. 
 
It is obvious that both face-to-face and interactive communication can involve 
fundamental challenges for communicators, but it is not so clear exactly how 
these challenges should be understood and related to each other. An important 
theoretical question is therefore this: To what extent are the communicative 
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challenges involved in the two forms of communication similar, and to what 
extent are they essentially different? 
 
A thorough analysis of all the potentially relevant aspects of this question 
would require a very comprehensive discussion. The obvious reason is that the 
question can be discussed from different perspectives, and that it is 
unreasonable, at least prima facie, to give one of these perspectives conceptual 
or epistemic priority (Davies 1998, Peacocke 1998). A better suggestion is that 
the similarities and differences between face-to-face communication and 
interactive communication can be elucidated in different ways, and that a 
variety of analyses can jointly contribute to a better, overall understanding of 
the nature of the two forms of communication. 
 
My primary motivation for exploring the nature of face-to-face and interactive 
communication has been the need to understand communicative challenges 
that confront students in a national further education program for medical 
paramedics. As the person responsible for one of the courses in this program I 
have, from a pedagogical and theoretical point of view, attempted to analyze 
the various forms of interaction paramedics are involved in. I have, in 
particular, sought to address two questions: What are some of the 
fundamental problems of understanding paramedics confront when they 
encounter patients and other health personnel in face-to-face situations? How 
are these problems similar to, but also different from, the challenges they 
confront when they communicate interactively via radio or telephone with 
other health personnel such as nurses in acute medical communication 
centers?  
 
The aim of this article is to address some important aspects of these questions 
on the basis of recent philosophical theories of speech acts and concept 
possession (Guttenplan 1996; Bechtel & Graham 1998). Within the theoretical 
framework I develop, I make a fundamental distinction between four 
communication conditions: firstly, speaker and audience (in a wide sense) 
need to share a common language that can be used to convey and understand a 
belief. Secondly, the audience must realize that the speaker has the intention 
of communicating this belief. Thirdly, speaker and audience must not 
associate beliefs and thoughts that are literally expressed in language with very 
different sets of other beliefs and thoughts. And finally, the experiences, 
motives and values that an audience ascribes to a speaker must not be 
radically different from the experiences, motives and values that a speaker 
intends to express.  
 
I will argue that this philosophical framework is completely general but also 
particularistic. That is, the four conditions can be used to show how face-to-
face and interactive communication involve some of the same fundamental 
communicative processes, but the conditions can also be used to illuminate 
crucial differences. This fact, I will argue, constitutes a plausible argument for 
using the conditions as a conceptual framework for analyzing empirical 
phenomena related to the two forms of communication. Moreover, the fact 
that the framework is suitable for understanding and explaining the two forms 
of communication constitutes an independent justification for the framework 
itself, as a genuine theory of communication.  
 
In the last part of the article, I examine the question of how it is possible to 
avoid various forms of misunderstanding that occur when one or several of the 
four communication conditions are not met. This discussion is to a large 
extent based on ideas that have been central within modern philosophical 
hermeneutics (Bleicher 1980; Mueller-Vollmer 1986; Smith 1997). I focus 
particularly on Gadamer’s (1975) idea of the aim of understanding as a ‘fusion 
of horizons’ and argue that in order to avoid poor communication, it is 
imperative that speakers are aware of various intrinsic aspects of the cognitive 
and emotional perspectives audiences have. I conclude that this and other 
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implications of the arguments I present should be of interest to anyone who 
wants to acquire a more philosophical understanding of the nature of face-to-
face and interactive communication. 
2. Background 
’Nasjonal Paramedic Utdanning’ (http://paramedic.hil.no/) is a national 
further education course for health personnel working as paramedics in the 
national health services in Norway. The program consists of six courses, four 
of which focus mainly on issues directly related to medicine, one on legal 
issues and one on communication and ethics. 
 
The need for focusing on communication in the program is obvious. In their 
daily work as paramedics the students are to a large extent involved in 
interpersonal relations where empathy, understanding and dialogue are 
important factors for securing successful interaction. With respect to the 
especially important relation between paramedics and patients, it is crucial 
that paramedics are able to understand adequately how patients experience 
and think about their states of disease, illness or sickness. Their choice of 
verbal and non-verbal behavior must be based on justified beliefs about the 
emotional and cognitive perspectives patients have on their condition of 
disease or illness (Enelow, Forde & Brummel-Smith 1996, Nordby 2004a; 
Nordby 2006). 
 
A detailed analysis of the diversity of communicative contexts paramedics face 
in interaction with patients and other health personnel falls outside the scope 
of this article. The important point I will focus on is that paramedics are 
involved in two forms of communication that are essentially different from 
each other. Firstly, they are involved in many direct, face-to-face encounters 
with patients, relatives of patients and other health personnel - situations in 
which they are able to observe not only the persons they communicate with 
but also the wider context of communication. When communicators are able to 
observe each other in this way, the obvious consequence is that it is possible to 
use more than uttered words as interpretative clues. Interpretation can also be 
made on the basis of non-verbal behavior and other observable aspects of the 
communicative context (Nordby 2004b). The significance of this consequence 
is obvious. Normally, when we seek to understand other persons we rely on 
literal interpretation. As Burge (1979, p.88) observes, “literal interpretation is 
ceteris paribus preferred” in ordinary discourse. For instance, if a speaker says 
‘It is raining’, audiences normally assume that the speaker, as long as he 
means to be sincere, expresses the belief that it is raining involving the 
concepts it, is and raining that are literally expressed by the words he utters.  
 
The qualification ‘normally’ is important. Sometimes certain aspects of a 
situation constitute good reason for being skeptical about literal 
interpretation, as in the case of incongruent communication involving a 
definite mismatch between verbal and non-verbal behavior. By being sensitive 
to the potential importance of non-verbal interpretative clues, communicators 
can avoid incongruent communication and other forms of poor 
communication that can occur when there is a mismatch between what is 
strictly speaking said and what is more generally displayed (Eide & Eide 
2004). In such cases of experienced inconsistency, attentive audiences use the 
wider context to form special non-literal and complex interpretations that do 
not correspond directly to the words that a speaker utters (Davidson 1984). 
Furthermore, it is a widespread view that there are no observable aspects of 
face-to-face communicative contexts that are irrelevant in principle for 
determining the non-literal meaning of verbal speech acts (Bezuidenhout 
1997; Cappelen & Lepore 2005). Face-to-face interpretation is essentially 
holistic; interpreters’ beliefs about the meaning of speakers’ utterances are 
based on assumptions about of all sorts of observations and all sorts of 
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assumptions about speakers’ social and cultural contexts.   
 
Face-to-face communication has received most attention in the health care 
literature focusing on interaction between health personnel and patients, but 
interactive communication - here defined as communication that does not 
involve a face-to-face encounter - is often equally important for paramedics 
(Tjora 1997). When an ambulance is called out, it has received an interactive 
appeal from an Acute Medical Communication center (AMC - center) where 
emergency nurses who cooperate with ambulance coordinators have answered 
an emergency call (‘113’ in Norway). This interactive appeal has several 
elements, including a precise a description as possible of where the patient is, 
a categorization of the acuteness of the assignment according to a code, and an 
indication of the nature of the patient’s state of injury, illness or disease.1     
 
Furthermore, while patients are being transported there is often extensive 
interactive dialogue between paramedics and the AMC-center. The paramedics 
often provide information about the patient’s state of illness or disease, they 
sometimes ask for medical supervision, and they sometimes require further 
back-up assistance from other medical units. There are, in fact, a wide range of 
aspects related to patients’ conditions that are of potential significance in this 
interactive communication. From the perspectives of all the parties involved, 
the experienced success of the paramedic-patient interaction will often depend 
heavily on adequate interactive communication. 
 
It should already now be emphasized that when I distinguish between face-to-
face communication and interactive communication in this way, I do not mean 
to argue that the two types of communication involve communicative 
processes that are different in principle. On the contrary, I believe that the 
assumptions I make are consistent with the plausible view that 
communication is a contextual, interpretative process, and that the difference 
between face-to-face and interactive communication fundamentally is a 
difference of degree. The reason this is an important point to make is that 
some might infer from the above that I rely on unjustified assumptions about 
some underlying principled distinction, but this is not the case. All I am 
presupposing is that we have a reasonable clear idea of what the differences 
between face-to-face and interactive communication are. 
 
More could be said about face-to-face and interactive communication and the 
particular ways in which paramedics are involved in these forms of 
communication, but this would fall outside the limits of this article. For my 
present argumentative purposes, it is sufficient to clarify the basic nature of 
two forms of communication. I assume, in particular, that I have made it clear 
that face-to-face communication and interactive communication must involve 
some different communicative challenges. In the following, I will first develop 
fundamental communication conditions that are relevant for understanding 
communication in general, and then use these conditions to shed light on 
relevant differences. 
3. Philosophical perspective 
In trying to understand some of the fundamental communicative challenges 
that paramedics confront in their daily work as health personnel, it has been 
important to make extensive observation studies in ambulances and AMC-
centers. These studies have given me valuable knowledge of how the students 
in the further education course experience and try to solve problems of 
communication. At the same time it is important to remember that although 
observations of human behavior and interaction must necessarily provide the 
basis for deciding whether communication succeeds or fails in a given context, 
such observations alone cannot establish whether communication succeeds. 
Conclusions about the status of a communicative process must always be made 
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on the basis of assumptions about the nature of communication. Traditionally, 
these assumptions have focused on how the ‘external’ - behavior and context – 
must match the ‘inner’ - the subjective and private (Davidson 1984, 
Bezuidenhout 1997; Cappelen & Lepore 2005). The traditional idea has been 
that a speaker has successfully communicated an ‘inner’ mental state S to an 
audience if, and only if, the audience understands that the speaker intends to 
use verbal or non-verbal actions to convey state S to him. 
 
Of course, making such communicative assumptions is something we do more 
or less unconsciously all the time in ordinary discourse, and even if the aim is 
nothing more than to explicate our common everyday assumptions, we have in 
effect started to clarify a theory of communication. Indeed, the difference 
between common sense theories of communication and the philosophical 
perspective I will apply here is not meant to be one of principle. The aim is 
rather to locate assumptions that (a) appeal to our ordinary ideas and (b) can 
be used to understand the fundamental challenges that face-to-face and 
interactive communication involve. 
 
The theoretical framework I will use in seeking to achieve this twofold aim is 
grounded in a modern tradition within cognitive science and philosophy of 
mind and language (Guttenplan 1996; Bechtel & Graham 1998). According to 
theories that fall within this tradition, verbal and non-verbal actions are 
conceived of as intentional language acts that express beliefs and thoughts. 
Beliefs and thoughts are in turn thought of as psychological attitudes to 
propositions involving mental concepts (Burge 1979; Peacocke 1992). For 
instance, the sentence ‘Water quenches thirst’ is normally used to express the 
belief that water quenches thirst involving the three concepts water, quenches 
and thirst. When a speaker associates these concepts with the sentence, 
communication of the concepts has succeeded if, and only if, the audience 
understands that the speaker intends to communicate a belief involving these 
concepts. 
 
It should be emphasized that this does not mean that an audience must 
necessarily think that is it correct to understand a language act in the same 
way as a speaker. For communicative purposes, all that is required is that the 
belief that an audience thinks that a speaker intends to communicate really is 
the belief the speaker intends to communicate. Questions about the objective 
and normative status of the meaning of language acts are therefore not directly 
relevant for questions of communication; whether communication happens 
must be determined on the basis of considerations of how speaker and 
audience understand each other, not on the basis of considerations of how it is 
correct to understand a given language (Nordby 2006).2  
 
This point is of particular importance in discourse involving disputed concepts 
with unclear application conditions, like the basic health concepts disease, 
illness and sickness (Mechanic 1968; Nettleton 1995; Worhall & Worhall 
2003). Health professionals sometimes encounter patients who do not 
understand these concepts in ways that correspond to influential conceptions 
within the health services, but if a paramedic tries to adopt a patient’s 
understanding for communicative purposes, exchange of concepts can happen 
even if the patient’s understanding is regarded as controversial or even 
incorrect.  
 
A second and more philosophical point that should be made about the 
framework of communication that I will use, is that I do not mean to argue 
that it constitutes the only possible way of analyzing communication. Basically, 
what I am relying on is that the framework represents a fundamental and 
influential way of understanding human interaction. I presuppose, in 
particular, that the assumption that successful communication involves 
successful exchange of subjective states has an intuitive, immediate appeal 
that is grounded in our ordinary communicative practices. Of course, in 
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everyday communication it is not common to think of exchange of thoughts 
and other subjective states as communicative processes, but the reason why 
the assumption is plausible is not that it aims to capture a process that we are 
consciously aware of in ordinary discourse. The reason is rather that as long as 
we conceive of communication as a rational activity, then we have to think of 
understanding and communication in cognitive terms: our understanding of 
the language we use, and the way we try to communicate our concepts to 
others, cannot be reduced to observable behaviour. As McDowell notes, 
 
...to learn the meaning of a word is to acquire an understanding that 
obliges us subsequently – if we have occasion to deploy the concept in 
question – to judge and speak in certain determinate ways, on pain of 
failure to obey the dictates of the meaning we have grasped” (McDowell 
1994, p. 160). 
 
McDowell’s claim is illuminating, not only because it is reasonable in itself, but 
also because McDowell ascribes it to the later Wittgenstein. In contrast to the 
tradition that McDowell’s interpretation of Wittgenstein is framed within, 
Wittgenstein is sometimes described as a modified behaviorist. According to 
this behaviorist interpretation, communication is essentially an observable 
activity within ‘language-games’, an activity that can be fully explained by 
referring to how we conform to language rules in different contexts (Kripke 
1982). 
 
Whether or not it is (contrary to what McDowell thinks) correct to ascribe 
some kind of behaviorist ‘third person’ perspective to Wittgenstein, is an 
important question of exegesis, but it would fall outside the scope of this 
article to address it. For the purposes here it is more important to think of 
behaviorism as a genuine source of challenge to cognitive analyses of 
communication. Independently of what Wittgenstein writes, some might argue 
that all versions of behaviorism are not obviously false, and that I have not 
showed why the cognitive framework of communication I have adopted here is 
more plausible than all these versions.    
 
Is important to say something briefly about this objection, first and foremost 
because the choice of framework has substantial different practical 
consequences. Consider as an example a patient who utters the sentence ‘I am 
in pain’ and a paramedic who comes to assistance. A behaviorist will typically 
think of this as a complete communicative process and claim that further 
explanations that refer to ‘underlying’ subjective states and audiences’ mental 
interpretations of these states are irrelevant, superfluous or ‘quasi’ 
explanations that fall outside the realm of proper psychological explanations.3  
 
There are in my opinion two main problems with this view. Firstly, and as 
indicated above, if McDowell is correct, then it is possible to think that the way 
we understand words and communicate meaning is derived from our use of 
language, and at the same time think that explanations of underlying mental 
phenomena are important. According to McDowell, what Wittgenstein is 
opposed to is not mental explanations per se, but a certain way of conceiving 
of the relation between ‘private’ subjective states and observable actions. It is 
only if one starts out with a classical Cartesian first-person perspective that 
one is easily led to think that this dualism involves overwhelmingly difficult 
epistemic and metaphysical obstacles (Burge 1979; Nordby 2004c). The 
problem with behaviorism as a response to the Cartesian tradition is that the 
position inherits the same dualistic way of thinking. The only difference is that 
behaviorism starts from the other end - from the ‘outside’ - and then claims 
that it is only this perspective that we have ‘real’ epistemic access to. 
Behaviorism is a general doctrine that is grounded in a positivistic idea of what 
counts as elements in scientific explanations of communication. 
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Secondly, objections to the scientific status of cognitive analyses of 
communication often seem to rest on the idea that there is only one ‘proper’ 
level of psychological explanation. However, there is no good reason for 
holding that this is so. It is true that it is possible, on one level, to explain 
communication from a third-person perspective. And from this perspective it 
is correct to say that communication has succeeded if an audience manifests 
appropriate behavior as a response to actions performed by a speaker. But 
accepting that this is correct is compatible with holding that there is more to 
say about underlying mental processes from other perspectives.   
 
Consider again the above example of a patient who utters ‘I am in pain’ and a 
paramedic who comes to assistance. How are we to understand this as a 
communicative process? We find it overwhelmingly natural to assume that the 
patient really is in pain (as long as he is sincere), that his utterance expresses 
his experience of being in pain, and that he intends the paramedic to 
understand that he is in pain (as long as his utterance is not merely an 
expression of pain) and so on. It is equally natural to assume that the reason 
the paramedic comes to assistance is that he thinks that the patient is in pain. 
This idea about the patient’s state of illness is derived from the fact that the 
patient used the sentence he used, and probably other interpretative clues like 
signs of pain. In short, the paramedic forms a belief about the patient’s state of 
mind on the basis of observable properties of the context. Again, this does not 
depend on a special Cartesian picture of the mental, or on the idea that 
interpretation is a conscious process. It is simply a natural way of widening a 
more narrow third-person explanation of what communication involves.  
 
Hopefully, this defense of the plausibility of the cognitive framework has 
indicated why it has a strong appeal, and why proponents of other approaches 
therefore face formidable challenges. Obviously, much more could be said 
about communication as a fundamental philosophical concept, but that would 
fall outside the aim here as long as my main focus is the application of the 
framework within health care. In the next section I will argue that theories of 
speech acts and concept possession can potentially shed theoretically 
interesting light on face-to-face and interactive communication, and that they 
can be used to analyze crucial differences within a completely general 
framework. I have explained how the framework focuses in a comprehensive 
way on verbal and non-verbal speech acts, but I have also indicated how it 
implies that an observable context can play a crucial role in interpretation. In 
the following I will first focus on the issue of general significance and then 
discuss the idea of an observable context in more detail. 
4. Communication conditions 
Clarifying how communication can succeed or fail is equivalent to clarifying 
communication conditions – conditions that must be met in order for 
successful communication to happen. In order to understand communicative 
challenges within the framework I have outlined, I will make a fundamental 
distinction between four conditions. The first is that communication requires a 
common language:  
 
(i) In order for an audience to understand a speaker, it is necessary 
that they share a platform of shared concepts. 
 
Here I use the expression ‘speaker’ in a wide sense to mean someone who has a 
belief, thought or other concept-involving psychological attitude that he wishes 
to communicate to an audience (one or several persons). Since audiences are 
unable to grasp speakers’ thoughts and beliefs directly, these subjective states 
have to be expressed in language acts that can be seen, heard or observed and 
interpreted in other ways. As emphasized above, this can be all sorts of 
intentional behavior, but for the sake of clarity I will in the following primarily 
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focus on verbal speech acts. Thus, in order for an audience to be able to 
understand that a speaker expresses a given belief, it is necessary that the 
speaker and the audience understand the sentence that the speaker uses in a 
sufficiently similar way, so that they associate the same concepts with the 
words that the speaker uses (Cappelen & Lepore 2005).  
 
The qualification ‘sufficiently similar’ is important. When I claim that speaker 
and audience must have a common language, I do not mean that they have to 
understand this language in the same way in the sense that they use it in 
exactly the same ‘language games’ (Wittgenstein 1953). It is sufficient that 
their understanding is so similar that that they associate the words that are 
used with the same concepts (Burge 1979; Peacocke 1992; Guttenplan 1996). 
 
This, in effect, presupposes that the conditions for the sharing of concepts are 
weaker than the conditions for sameness of understanding. It is obvious that 
communicators must have some similar understanding of a word in order to 
associate the same concept with it – the understanding that the audience has 
must to some extent approximate the speaker’s understanding.4 But this leaves 
open what a sufficiently similar understanding is, and exactly what the 
threshold condition for shared concepts is has been a disputed issue (for a 
discussion of this, see Nordby 2004c).  
 
I will not presuppose any specific view on this issue here, but I will rely on the 
widespread idea that it is unnecessary that communicators use a word in 
exactly the same way in order to associate the same concept with it. The main 
reason why this idea is reasonable is this: We very seldom use language in 
exactly the same ways; there are normally differences due to our respective 
social and cultural contexts. So if we needed an identical understanding in 
order to share concepts, we would, in fact, seldom be able to exchange beliefs 
and thoughts involving the same concepts. Furthermore, laypersons should 
not need complete expert competence regarding the application conditions of 
a term in order to express the same concept as persons who have expert 
competence (Putnam 1981; Pessin & Goldberg 1996). If that were the case, 
laypersons within a given area of discourse would be unable to communicate 
with experts (consider again the area of health care and the relation between 
patients and medical doctors). This is a counterintuitive consequence, and it 
constitutes a good reason for being skeptical about the view that a platform of 
shared concepts requires an identical understanding.  
 
The second communication condition I wish to focus on is more 
straightforward: 
 
(ii) In order for a speaker to be able to communicate a belief, he needs 
to have the attention of the audience. 
 
The idea is as follows: A speaker might express a belief, used a language that 
the speaker and the audience have a sufficiently similar understanding of and 
think it has reached the consciousness of the audience. It can nevertheless 
happen that the audience fails to realize that the speaker intends to 
communicate this belief. The reason for this may be lack of attention, 
problems of interpretation due to a chaotic situation, or an impaired capacity 
for rational reasoning (a patient might be in a state of shock or under the 
influence of drugs). But the problem may also be of a more technological 
nature, e.g. computers that do not work so that audiences are unable to use 
them as interactive communication tools.  
 
It is important to bear in mind that in order for a misunderstanding of this 
kind to occur, the speaker must be unaware of the communicative problems. 
The speaker must genuinely believe that he has the attention of the audience, 
that there is no significant communicative ‘noise’ or disruption; otherwise he 
would not be sincerely attempting to communicate a belief. An example can be 
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used to illustrate the point: 
 
Paramedics encounter a patient who has taken a large amount of 
paracetamol. Relatives have called 113, and the patient himself, in a 
confused and agitated state, makes it clear that he does not want to be 
taken to hospital. In order to persuade the patient that treatment in 
hospital is necessary, the paramedics try to inform the patient about the 
physiological effects of paracetamol and they tell him that large doses of 
paracetamol can lead to serious irreversible damage to the liver. They 
hope that this information will lead the patient to change his mind, but 
this does not happen. Consequently, the paramedics decide that there is 
little use in trying to persuade the patient, and they begin to consider 
more complicated strategies for securing necessary transport and 
treatment.  
 
In this situation it was evident that the paramedics assumed that the 
information about the negative health effects of large doses of paracetamol had 
reached the consciousness of the patient. However, it soon became evident 
that this had not happened. When the patient calmed down and his relatives 
told him what the paramedics had said, the patient realized the gravity of the 
situation and made it clear that he wanted to go to the hospital after all. In the 
first place, because of his confused state and the stressful encounter with the 
paramedics, the patient did not form the belief that the paramedics intended 
to communicate and thought that it was important to communicate.  
 
If we manage to avoid the two forms of misunderstands that occur when 
conditions (i) or (ii) are not met, does this mean that communication has 
succeeded? Not necessarily. Even if speaker and audience have a platform of 
shared concepts, and even if the speaker has the attention of the audience so 
that the message that he intends to communicate actually reaches the 
consciousness of the audience, it might still happen that the audience 
associates this message with beliefs and thoughts that are very different from 
the set of beliefs and thoughts that the speaker associates with the message. 
This third form of misunderstanding corresponds to a third communication 
condition: 
 
(iii) The wider set of beliefs and thoughts that an audience associates 
with a belief that is directly expressed in language must not be 
radically different from the wider set of beliefs and thoughts that the 
speaker associates with this belief. 
 
As Davidson (1987, p.449) notes, interpretation always “rests on vague 
assumptions about what is and what is not shared” by speaker and audience, 
and problems typically arise when assumptions about what is shared beliefs 
turn out to be incorrect. Of course, if communicators’ perspectives are so 
radically different that they influence the semantic interpretation of the 
language that a speaker uses, then the misunderstanding that arises is a 
misunderstanding of the first kind (i). In such cases speaker and audience do 
not even have a common language. A misunderstanding of the third kind 
requires that the message that is literally expressed by language is understood, 
that the communicators have a sufficiently similar understanding of the words 
that are used in the sense explained above. The problem that can still arise is 
that the beliefs that surround this message are radically different. An example 
can illustrate the point:  
 
An AMC-nurse tells a patient who has called 113 that ‘The ambulance is on its 
way’. The patient forms the belief that the ambulance is on its way, but he then 
forms a further belief - the belief that the ambulance will arrive very soon 
within the next few minutes. The patient expresses disappointment when the 
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ambulance arrives after 30 minutes. 
 
In this case communication of the belief that the ambulance is on its way has 
succeeded. The AMC-nurse has the attention of the patient, and they both 
associate the concepts the, ambulance, is, on, its and way with the sentence 
‘The ambulance is on its way’. The problem is that communication has failed in 
the wider sense that the AMC-nurse does not associate the belief that the 
ambulance is on its way with the belief that the ambulance will arrive within a 
few minutes.5 The patient, however, forms this association. He grasps the 
content of the message that the nurse expresses literally in words, but he then 
forms further associations that are radically different from the way the nurse 
intends this message to be understood. 
 
The qualification ‘radically different’ is important here. Two persons never 
associate the beliefs and thoughts they form with other beliefs and thoughts in 
exactly the same way; there will always be some different associations as long 
as interpretation is shaped by social and cultural context (Burge 1979; 
Davidson 1984; Smith 1997). The important point is that there are many cases 
in which the associations that are formed are so different that poor 
communication occurs. From the perspectives of speakers, it is the beliefs that 
it is most important to communicate that are ordinarily expressed literally in 
words; that is why communication of these beliefs is normally straightforward. 
It is when speaker and audience understand what is not strictly speaking said 
in significantly different ways, that a misunderstanding of the third kind (iii) 
occurs. 
 
Is communication ensured if we manage to avoid the three forms of 
misunderstanding that correspond to communication conditions (i)-(iii)? We 
might think so, but this is because we sometimes tend to forget that 
communication is not always a rational activity. In addition to beliefs and 
thoughts that are true or false, there are many other subjective states that are 
important in human interaction. The fourth and final communication 
condition is meant to capture the fact that we sometimes communicate 
psychological states that are essentially different from beliefs and thought that 
are true or false: 
 
(iv) The values, emotions and other non-conceptual subjective states 
that an audience ascribes to a speaker must not be different from the 
values, emotions and other non-conceptual states that the speaker 
intends to communicate. 
 
By ‘values, emotions and other non-conceptual subjective states’ I mean states 
that cannot be ascribed as beliefs or thoughts that involve concepts. When we 
think about communication we often tend to focus on such states, on attitudes 
we ascribe by saying things like ‘S believes that p’ or ‘S thinks that p’ where ‘p’ 
is a concept-involving proposition. For instance, when I say ‘S believes that 
snow is white’, I ascribe to S the attitude of believing in a proposition involving 
the three concepts snow, is and white (which is true if snow is white and 
otherwise false). It is easy to forget that we sometimes intend to communicate 
psychological states that are not attitudes to propositions. Personal values are 
not attitudes to propositions, it makes no grammatical sense to say ‘S values 
that p’ and replace for ‘p’ propositions that are true or false depending on how 
the world is. Personal values are rather attitudes to ‘forms of living’ 
(Wittgenstein 1953; Johnston 1989); to the ways we wish to live our lives and 
the activities we like to participate in (Dancy 1996). The same applies to 
emotions and other personal experiences. The way I feel a certain pain, or the 
way I have a visual impression of a computer in front of me, cannot be directly 
experienced by another person. I can attempt to report and communicate my 
experience by using a sentence that I think is true or false (‘I am in pain’, ‘I 
have the impression of seeing a computer in front of me’), but this sentence is 
not identical to the state I talk about and have privileged first-person access to. 
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The state is a pure subjective experience, not a belief or thought about 
something (Rosenthal 1991).  
 
Understood in this way, the significance of (iv) becomes similar to that of (iii). 
We often try to communicate our personal values and experiences to other 
persons, but sometimes our audiences ascribe to us states that are different 
from those we intend to communicate. For instance, a patient who uses 
emotional vocabulary like ‘I am in pain’ will normally be interpreted as 
expressing a state with a certain qualitative ‘pain’ content. If this 
interpretation is wrong - if the pain that the paramedic thinks that the patient 
feels is very different from the qualitative nature of the pain the patient feels – 
then a misunderstanding of the fourth kind has occurred.  
 
Values that are attitudes to forms of life or activities are subject to the same 
problems of interpretation. In discourse between persons from different social 
or cultural contexts the values that are ascribed may be different from the 
values that the communicators have. It is reasonable to assume that this 
sometimes occurs in paramedic-patient interaction. A patient who is perceived 
as a person who appreciates that the paramedics are acting in a certain way 
might in fact be a patient who endorses an alternative course of action. Typical 
cases include interaction between elderly people and younger paramedics who 
have a more ‘modern’ way of life. In one case observed by the author of this 
paper, a paramedic consequently addressed an elderly patient by his first 
name, even though it was fairly evident that the patient would have 
appreciated an alternative course of action (e.g. he introduced himself using 
his surname). 
 
This last communication condition (iv) might seem to inflate the philosophical 
framework of speech acts and concepts, but this is not the case. On the 
contrary, since the first three conditions focus entirely on concept-involving 
beliefs and thoughts, it is possible to formulate a fourth condition that 
captures the remaining ‘subjective’ and qualitative dimension of human 
communication. The philosophical framework I have outlined leaves room for 
this further condition precisely because it makes a sharp distinction between 
concept-involving and non-concept-involving subjective states.  
5. Implications: interactive and face-to-face 
communication 
I am not going to argue that the four conditions I have presented represent the 
only possible way of analyzing communication. Holding that they are 
reasonable is consistent with holding that there are other conditions that are 
important as well. In fact, I do not even mean to provide a direct argument for 
the view that the conditions offer a plausible analysis of how poor 
communication can occur. What I primarily wish to focus on is their 
explanatory power, particularly the way they can be used to shed light on the 
similarities and differences between face-to-face and interactive 
communication. 
 
If we start with the first condition (i), i.e. having a common language, how is 
this condition relevant for understanding the nature of the two forms of 
communication? The basic distinction to be made in connection with (i) is that 
between what a word means and what a speaker means. An utterance heard on 
the phone or a sentence read on a computer screen means something – it has a 
semantic content. But when an audience is confronted with a speaker the 
immediate question for the audience is as follows: What is the mental state – 
belief, thought or value - that the speaker has and intends to communicate? 
 
This difference of focus corresponds to two different ways of conceiving of a 
speech act. The activity that is performed interactively is a pure language act; 
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the social context of the act is not part of the meaning of the act. From the 
perspective of an audience, the aim is to understand the proposition expressed 
by the language shared by the speaker and the audience. The focus must be 
explicitly or implicitly on meaning, and the relevant interpretative activities 
correspond to the scope of philosophy of language – to philosophical questions 
about the meaning of language. 
 
Face-to-face communication, on the other hand, is a social activity that 
essentially belongs within pragmatics and philosophy of mind. The question 
that confronts face-to-face communicators is this: What is the belief that the 
speaker in this context uses language to express? This is not a semantic 
question about the meaning of the words per se, but a question about the 
psychological nature of the relevant mental states of the speaker.  
 
Even though the interpretative activities involved in the two forms of 
communication in this way correspond to different philosophical disciplines, it 
is important to recognize that the activities are similar in the sense that they 
both involve literal interpretation. That is, we normally assume that words that 
are used literally express the concepts communicated. We assume, for 
instance, that the word ‘dog’ in interactive communication means dog, just as 
we assume that a speaker who uses the word ‘dog’ expresses a belief involving 
the concept dog. In this sense there is an important similarity between face-to-
face and interactive communication, and the requirement that communicators 
need to have a common language can be used to understand challenges related 
to concept communication within both forms of communication.  
 
At the same time it is important to bear in mind that there are sometimes good 
reasons for not accepting literal interpretations, and in such cases the 
differences between face-to-face and interaction communication become more 
significant. In order to show why this is so it is important to distinguish three 
kinds of expressions. The first is what might be considered words with vague 
or unclear application conditions. Many words that are used in everyday 
discourse do not have precise definitions, and the meaning explanations 
speakers give often differ even though they are members of the same linguistic 
community (Burge 1979; 1986).6 Three of the most disputed words in the area 
of health care are ‘disease’, ‘illness’ and ‘sickness’ (Lupton 1994; Radley 1994; 
Worhall and Worhall 2001), but the point is of course general. There are 
countless vague or abstract words that communicators tend to understand in 
significantly different ways. 
 
The fact that we commonly use vague words has an important consequence: 
different conceptions of what words mean are normally easier to detect face-
to-face than interactively. There are at least three reasons why this is the case. 
Firstly, face-to-face communication more often than interactive 
communication involves substantial dialogue over time in which 
communicators realize that they do not have a similar understanding. 
Furthermore, when differences emerge and receive attention, audiences who 
are interested in communicating tend to adjust their conceptions of what 
speakers mean. Secondly, it is sometimes evident from the body language or 
verbal behavior of a person that he does not share the understanding of 
another person. If a doctor tells a patient who is feeling ill that it has not been 
establish that he has a disease, and if the patient thinks that the doctor has a 
very narrow, rigid understanding of ‘disease’, the patient’s body language may 
manifest incongruent communication: even though the patient says that he 
accepts the doctor’s opinion, the patient’s body language or other aspects of 
the communicative context indicate that he disagree. Thirdly, in face-to-face 
communication speakers have time, and it is often natural, to explicate in 
some detail how they understand words they conceive of as controversial. In 
particular, speakers often provide direct or indirect meaning explanations of 
words they think the audience has an incomplete understanding of. 
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Again, these points must be understood as prima facie principles that do not 
cover all cases. For instance, speakers regularly provide meaning explanations 
in interactive communication, consider an explanation of what an ‘essay’ is 
that a teacher distributes to his students via the internet. And face-to-face 
communication does not always involve extensive rational dialogue and proper 
explanations of theoretical or technical terms that are conceived to be 
important, as the above ‘paracetamol case’ clearly illustrates. However, it is 
surely the rule and not the exception that it is easier to detect and influence 
different conceptions of what a word means in face-to-face communication 
than in interactive communication. 
 
This also applies to a second kind of words that can be termed ‘qualitative 
words’. Qualitative words are words that refer to private, individual 
experiences, or subjective states that have a significant personal element. 
Typical examples are words that denote states like pain, nausea or dizziness, 
but the category, as I understand it here, also includes emotional vocabulary 
like ‘love’, ‘compassion’ and ‘empathy’ that are used to communicate states 
that do not so clearly refer to determinate conscious experiences. The 
important point is that these words also have a subjective, private dimension 
that it can be difficult to detect in communication.   
 
Communicative challenges related to the use of qualitative words are to a large 
extent similar to the challenges related to unclear words, but qualitative words 
have an additional dimension: an audience has by definition only indirect 
access to a speaker’s first-person experiences, but it is these experiences that 
constitute the reference and thereby the individual meaning of qualitative 
words. Qualitative words report these experiences, but they can only function 
as interpretative clues to the underlying nature of the experiences. This does 
not necessarily mean that the experiences are completely hidden from an 
audience; there are few modern traditions in philosophy of mind that hold that 
emotional states are fully independent from behavior (Rosenthal 1991; Davies 
1995; Guttenplan 1996). The important point is that there must be some 
independence; there are not many theorists today who accept the extreme and 
classical behaviorist doctrine that experiences are identical to behavior (Ryle 
1949). And if we accept the modern, more modest view that experiences are 
partly displayed in behavior, then it is reasonable to assume that 
communication of qualitative words more often succeeds in face-to face 
communication than in interactive communication. Normally, facial 
expressions or other forms of observable body language constitute part of the 
content of the experiences that a speaker intends to communicate. 
 
The third category of words that deserve attention is technical or theoretical 
words. In face-to-face encounters it is sometimes sufficient to watch a person’s 
eyes in order to discern whether theoretical vocabulary represents meaningless 
sounds or not. Furthermore, in face-to-face interaction it is possible to use 
various forms of body language as specialized communicative tools. A good 
example is the non-verbal dialogue in AMC centers between nurses and 
ambulance coordinators. While talking to patients on the phone, they are able 
to observe each other and use body language – language that patients do not 
observe  – as part of the basis for deciding what to do. An ambulance 
coordinator might for instance hold up two fingers to suggest to the nurse that 
the ambulance should be called out under ‘code 2’. If the nurse nods while the 
patient is on the line, the ambulance coordinator normally proceeds to call up 
an ambulance under ‘code 2’.  
 
There is also a further aspect of the communication of technical words that is 
essentially different from the communication of unclear words and 
experiences. The fact that technical words have a standard, normative 
meaning means that it is possible to make a principled distinction between 
experts who have a complete, correct understanding and laypeople who have 
an incomplete understanding. Within recent philosophy of mind, it has been a 
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widespread view that if a layperson is willing to defer to an expert’s correct 
understanding of a word, then he possesses the same concept as the expert 
even though he does not have a complete understanding. Burge expresses this 
view in an illuminating way when he writes that   
  
…wherever the subject has attained a certain competence in large 
relevant parts of his language and has assumed a certain general 
commitment or responsibility to the communal conventions governing 
the language’s symbols, the expressions the subject uses take on a certain 
inertia in determining attributions of mental content to him. (Burge 
1979, p. 114) 
 
It is only when a person with an incomplete understanding is unwilling to 
defer to the normative meaning of a word that he should be understood as 
someone who has chosen to associate the word with his own individual 
concept that does not correspond to the correct, normative understanding. 
Deference-willingness is in this sense a precommunicative attitude: laypeople 
need to have this attitude in the first place in order to be able to possess the 
same concepts as experts who possess and fully understand the correct, 
standard concept. 
 
The fact that this point is valid only when the expert-layperson distinction 
applies has an important implication: from the perspective of a speaker who 
has a competent understanding, it is often easier to secure a platform of shared 
concepts by using words with precise application conditions than by using 
unclear, everyday words that do not have standard, normative definitions. The 
reason is that audiences normally think they are entitled to understand the 
latter words in special, idiosyncratic ways if there is no profession that knows 
what the correct understanding is (Helman 1984; Lupton 1994). More 
generally, communicators tend to think that they are justified in 
understanding and using unclear or vague expressions in accordance with how 
they have learned them in their particular social and cultural contexts, even 
though they know that other speakers sometimes use them in other ways in 
other contexts. In such cases the idea of deference-willingness does not apply: 
Communicators from different contexts will stand face to face and be unwilling 
to revise their understanding.7 But when one of the parties is perceived as 
being an expert on the application of a word within a given area – e.g. the way 
students often think of their teachers - the non-expert will normally defer and 
thereby possess the same concept as the expert.  
 
If one seeks to apply this theory of deference-willingness, the strategy will 
obviously work only if it is possible to give the audience a sufficient 
understanding and if the audience is really willing to defer. The latter 
condition is particularly important. Even if there are standard application 
conditions for a term, this does not help if the audience thinks of the speaker 
as a strict authority and consequently does not defer to his explanations. From 
the perspective of a speaker with a competent understanding who faces an 
audience who does not have a complete understanding, it is therefore 
necessary to create a situation where the audience feels comfortable deferring 
to the normative meaning in order to secure a platform of shared concepts. 
Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that this aim is easier to achieve face-
to-face than interactively. Often a simple smile, a friendly gesture or other 
form of body language is sufficient for creating an atmosphere in which 
audiences think of speakers not only as experts, but as sympathetic experts. In 
this deep philosophical sense, it is easier to secure communication of concepts 
in face-to-face relations than in interactive relations.  
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6. Further implications 
So far I have focused on implications of the first communication condition (i), 
but as emphasized above, meeting (i) can only be a necessary condition for 
meeting the three further conditions (ii)-(iv). When I claim that two persons 
must understand a language in the same way, what I mean is that they must 
understand it in the same way in general. Obviously, when a speaker does not 
have the attention of an audience, speaker and audience do not understand the 
language act that is performed in the same way there and then. What the 
second communication condition (ii) was meant to capture is the idea that in 
order for the communication of a belief to succeed, the attention of the 
audience is needed in addition to a shared platform of concepts.   
 
Is (ii) a condition that is relevant in both face-to-face and interactive 
communication in the way (i) is? It is since speakers always need the attention 
of their audience in order to be able to communicate beliefs and thoughts. The 
differences between the two forms of communication do not matter; (ii) 
represents a fundamental communicative aim both in face-to-face and in 
interactive communication.  
 
At the same time there is an obvious difference between face-to-face and 
interactive communication: it is much easier to secure the attention of an 
audience in the former than in the latter. After all, speakers are normally able 
to see whether they have the attention of their audience, and it is also easier 
for them to understand how to proceed in order to secure attention. Again, this 
does not apply without exception. Audiences might ostensibly understand and 
internalize what a speaker says but nevertheless make it clear later that they 
have not formed the beliefs that speakers intend to communicate. Causes can 
be states of shock or stress but also, less dramatically, lack of genuine attention 
or problems of concentration.  
 
It is equally evident that the third communication condition that focused on 
associate misunderstandings applies in both face-to-face and interactive 
communication. Both forms of communication can involve audiences who 
associate a message with beliefs and thoughts that are radically different from 
the beliefs and thoughts that a speaker has. Whether or not the 
communicators observe each other is not crucial for this. An audience who 
hears a speaker over the phone might ascribe to the speaker beliefs that the 
speaker does not have, even though the audience understands what is literally 
expressed by the sentence in question, as the above ‘The ambulance is on its 
way’ case clearly illustrated. But this case could also be redescribed to show 
how a similar misunderstanding could occur face-to-face.  Imagine for 
instance a doctor who tells a patient who has been hospitalized for some time 
that ‘Your condition has really improved’. The patient takes this to mean that 
the doctor thinks that he will be able to leave the hospital within a few days, he 
becomes frustrated when this turn out to not happen, and we might even 
imagine that he tells relatives that the doctor gave him false expectations. The 
problem, we may assume, is that doctor does not associate the belief that the 
patient’s condition has improved with the belief that the patient should be sent 
home within a few days. He does not mean to commit himself to this or any 
other specific interpretation of ‘improved condition’.8 
 
Even though these two cases clearly show that associate misunderstandings 
can occur both in face-to-face and interactive interaction, they also suggest an 
argument for the view that they more often occur in the former than the latter. 
When doctors in situations like the above utter sentences like ‘Your condition 
has really improved’, it is not unusual for patients to ask ‘Does this mean that I 
will be able to go home soon?’ if they are concerned about this. There is 
typically more of an atmosphere of dialogue and conversation in face-to-face 
communication, and this often causes audiences to clarify their own 
perspectives and make inquires about the speaker’s beliefs. In fact, 
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communicators’ overall communicative aim is often to clarify their own 
perspectives and the perspectives of the persons they are talking to. Associate 
misunderstandings typically occur when the situation is hectic, or when there 
is for some other reason poor dialogue about different aspects of the issue of 
discourse. In interactive communication, the problem is often that it takes a lot 
of time to clarify one’s own perspective extensively. 
 
The same point applies in connection with the last communication condition 
(iv), which focused on incorrect ascriptions of experiences and values, but now 
communicators face an additional challenge that makes observation even 
more significant. On the phone or via radio a person’s subjective states can 
only be presented as descriptions or single words that express these states. 
Everything depends on the interpretation that the audience makes; the 
language that is heard on the phone or seen on the screen is the only 
interpretative clue. An observable communicative context, on the other hand, 
will often provide vital clues to the nature of an underlying experience. An 
adequate understanding of a pain state will normally be easier to achieve in 
face-to-face encounters because a person’s body language tends to reveal 
intrinsic aspects of the state.  
 
As long as a person’s immediate surroundings provide important clues to his 
social and cultural background a similar point applies when values are 
communicated. Our personal values, the activities we like to participate in and 
the complex ways we wish to live our lives, are first and foremost accessible by 
observations of how we actually choose to live our lives in the contexts we are 
in. In this sense similarities and differences in values are often easier to detect 
face-to-face than interactively, and incorrect attributions of values do not 
occur so easily. 
 
There is a further even more fundamental difference between the fourth and 
the first three communication conditions. The first three focus on conditions 
for communication of concept-involving prepositional attitudes like beliefs 
and thoughts. This means that they are subject to the aim of understanding as 
a ‘fusion of horizon’, the idea that fundamental understanding is a matter of 
speaker and audience sharing subjective states involving the same concepts. 
(Gadamer 1975, 1994; Mueller-Vollmer 1986; Green 2000). A speaker and an 
audience who share many of the same beliefs have cognitive horizons that are 
much more similar than communicators who do not have many of the same 
beliefs. From the perspective of a speaker, the practical implications of this 
idea that a fusion of horizons should be regarded as an aim of understanding 
can be formulated as three action-guiding questions: corresponding to the first 
communication condition (i), does the audience have an understanding of the 
language I use that is sufficiently similar to my own understanding? 
Corresponding to the second condition (ii), do I have the genuine attention of 
the audience? And corresponding to the third (iii), is it reasonable to think that 
the audience will associate the belief that I express literally in language with 
other beliefs that are radically different from the beliefs I have?  
 
It is important to recognize that since the fourth condition does not focus on 
conceptual states a similar question related to the idea of a shared horizon 
cannot be formulated. An experiential state like pain does not involve concepts 
that can be shared with another person. Of course, if a person reports ‘I am in 
pain’, and if an interpreter takes this to mean that the person is in pain, then 
they share the concept pain. But as emphasized above, this is not the same as 
sharing the state of pain. Similarly with values; a speaker might appreciate 
living his life in a certain way and attempt to communicate this value to an 
audience by using a particular sentence. The audience might associate this 
sentence with the same concepts as the speaker, but this does not mean that 
they share the same value. In order to understand what the underlying value 
is, the audience needs to take a further step and identify the value state that 
lies beneath the surface of language. A misunderstanding of the fourth kind 
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occurs when this attempt fails. The question a speaker needs to ask in order to 
prevent misunderstandings of this kind is therefore this: Have I correctly 
understood the values of my audience, and is there a chance that I will be 
ascribed values that I do not have?   
 
This question about values should be sharply distinguished from the question 
of whether a person expresses a true or false subjective state. A belief is subject 
to rational discussion about truth and falsity; if someone thinks that a person 
has a false belief, he can rationally try to show the person that the proposition 
he believes in is false. Since values are attitudes to activities and not 
propositions, they are not subject to similar questions about objectivity. If 
someone wants to influence or change another person’s values, the only 
rational way of doing so is to go beneath them, to locate possible beliefs and 
thoughts they are grounded in. For instance, I appreciate drinking a lot of 
coffee. This is an everyday personal value I have, but I would not have it if I 
formed the belief that drinking a lot of coffee is very unhealthy. So, if a person 
I consider to be a medical expert explained to me that me my activity is very 
unhealthy, then I would probably form this belief, and I would no longer have 
my value. 
 
It is therefore sometimes possible to change a person’s values by identifying 
unjustified beliefs that support them. The problem arises only if we think that 
a person’s values are equivalent to beliefs and thoughts and consequently 
attempts to show the person that his values are not ‘objectively correct’. A 
person who is subject to such a criticism will typically feel that we are 
encroaching on a private sphere that we are not entitled to enter; the person 
has already an implicit grasp of the nature of personal values as subjective 
states that we have an individual right to form.  
 
A further discussion of this issue would fall outside the scope of this article, 
but I think it has been important to make it clear exactly why successful 
communication presupposes that communicators, implicitly or explicitly, are 
able to distinguish beliefs and thoughts from personal values. A fundamental 
identification of a person’s values is often crucial for successful 
communication, regardless whether or not we want to change these values. 
7. Conclusion 
By using examples from paramedic-patient interaction within a theoretical 
framework from philosophy of mind and language, I have tried to explain how 
the idea of communication conditions can be used to analyze communication. 
In doing so I have made a distinction between four fundamental conditions. 
The first focuses on the idea of a shared language, the second on 
communicative attention, the third on the way we associate beliefs with other 
beliefs, and the fourth on subjective states like experiences and values that do 
not have a conceptual, propositional content.  
 
I have argued that these four conditions constitute fundamental 
communicative aims both face-to-face and in interactive communication. At 
the same time they suggest different strategies for how these aims should be 
achieved within the two realms of communication. The fact that the four 
conditions cover both forms of communication constitutes a fundamental 
justification for adopting these strategies in face-to-face and interactive 
interaction. This does not mean that the conditions imply that it is easier to 
secure successful face-to-face communication than it is to secure interactive 
communication. Obviously, it is natural to assume that it is often easier to 
achieve the former than the latter (but there are some obvious exceptions), but 
the question of whether this really is so remains a further question. My aim 
has been to develop a plausible framework for addressing this and other 
normative questions related to face-to-face and interactive communication.  
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In addition to this instrumental justification for applying the communication 
conditions, .I think it is important to recognize a further argument. It is 
sometimes held that an instrumental justification of a theory must be 
essentially incomplete, since it is possible for an instrumental theory to be 
false (Dennett 1978). But in this context I do not think this is a genuine 
possibility. Philosophical theories of communication are after all meant to 
capture ordinary discourse - it is standardly assumed that whether they do or 
not is what makes them true or false  - so in this case the fact that the 
conditions match our communicative practices constitutes a good reason for 
holding that they are true. Too often philosophical theories of communication 
are developed in isolation from areas of application, even though it is claimed 
that they are grounded in common sense. What I have tried to show is that the 
four communication conditions are really grounded in ordinary 
communicative practices. 
 
Finally, I would like to make it clear that it has not been possible to discuss in 
detail the practical consequences of the analyses I have made within the limits 
of this article. The aim has been to develop and clarify some fundamental 
philosophical distinctions and to point out some reasonable implications of 
these distinctions. However, more empirical research is necessary to explore 
these implications further. What I have offered is a framework for doing such 
research, but this is a framework that in itself should be modified and 
developed further on the basis of such research.  
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1 An important motivation for providing information about the patient’s condition is 
that the paramedics can prepare themselves mentally and in practical terms for the 
situation that awaits them. 
2 It is in general a sound methodological principle that issues of understanding and 
communication are not subject to questions about normativity in the way questions of 
truth and knowledge are. 
3 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this journal for pointing out that this 
objection needs to be addressed. 
4 As emphasized above, this can be an understanding that the audience thinks is correct 
in general but also an understanding that is employed for communicative purposes. 
The important point is that the understanding that the audience employs must 
approximate the speaker’s understanding. 
5 When the condition of a patient is perceived as not being acute the ambulance is not 
required to adopt ‘code one’ which is the code for acute situations, and it might take 
some time before it arrives (but outside central areas it might take some time even if 
the code is ‘code one’). 
6
 A meaning explanation is here understood as the explanation a speaker would give if 
he was asked to explain what a word applies to. Meaning explanations are very seldom 
conceived of as complete descriptions of what a word means; we do not consider them 
as sentences that capture the whole meaning of the term we are asked to explain.  They 
are rather statements that capture central aspects of a word’s meaning. Compare, for 
instance, the explanation ‘The word ‘dog’ applies to a group of mammals with four legs’ 
with the explanation ‘ The word ‘dog’ applies to an animal my grandmother has’. Only 
the first statement is normally conceived of as a meaning explanation.  
7 Consider again a doctor who tells a patient that he has not been able to locate any 
underlying disease. The patient, we might suppose, thinks that he must have a disease, 
and thinks that the doctor has a very narrow understanding of ‘disease’. An important 
part of the reason why such an attitude is widespread is that the patient thinks that he 
is entitled to use ‘disease’ in the way he has learned the word in his special social and 
cultural context. This point generalizes to countless words with non-standard 
application conditions. 
8
  This kind of misunderstanding is sometimes displayed in newspapers, under 
headlines like  
‘The doctor gave me six months to live’. One should be skeptical about the idea that 
doctors very often state predictions in such a bold way.  In fact, what has often been 
stated is something much weaker (‘There is a significant possibility that…’), but 
patients often associate these statements with stronger claims. This is a general 
phenomenon that most professionals involved in interaction with various forms of 
clients or patients should be aware of: we tend to forget qualifications like ‘significant 
possibility’ after a while, and we think of claims that have been made as much stronger 
than what they in reality were. 
